This paper explores the behavior of rational probabilistic deciders (RPDs) in three types of collectives: zero sum matrix games, fractional interactions, and Edgeworth exchange economies. The properties of steady states and transients are analyzed as a function of the level of rationality, N, and, in some cases, the size of the collective, M. It is shown that collectives of RPDs, may or may not behave rationally, depending, for instance, on the relationship between N and M (under fractional interactions) or N and the minimum amount of product exchange (in Edgeworth economies). The results obtained can be useful for designing rational reconfigurable systems that can autonomously adapt to changing environments.
Introduction

Issues addressed and results obtained.
The notion of a rational probabilistic decider (RPD) was introduced in [1] . Roughly speaking, an RPD is a stochastic system, which takes less penalized decisions with larger probabilities than other ones (see Section 1.2 below for a precise definition). Two types of RPDs have been analyzed: local (L-RPD) and global (G-RPD). L-RPDs take their decisions based on the penalty function of their current states, while G-RPDs consider penalties of other states as well.
In [1] , the behavior of individual RPDs was investigated. It was shown that asymptotic properties of both L-and G-RPDs are the same: both converge to the best decision when the so-called level of rationality tends to infinity. However, their temporal properties are different: G-RPDs react at a faster rate, which gives them an advantage in nonstationary environments.
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The current paper is devoted to group (or collective) behavior of RPDs. A collective of RPDs is formed by assuming that their penalty functions are interrelated in the sense that the penalty of each depends on the actions of the others. Three types of penalty functions are considered. In the first one, the penalty function is defined by the payoff matrix of a zero sum game (with the players being RPDs). In the second, referred to as fractional, the penalty function depends on the fraction of the group members that select a particular decision. The fractional interactions considered are of two types: homogeneous and nonhomogeneous. In the homogeneous case, all group members are penalized identically, while in the nonhomogeneous one the penalty depends on the particular subgroup to which an RPD belongs. Finally, the third type of penalty function is defined by an economic model referred to as the Edgeworth exchange economy.
In all these types of interactions, the question of interest is that will a collective of RPDs behave rationally, that is, converge to the state where the penalty is minimized? Analyzing this question, this paper reports the following results.
In the matrix game environment, (a) both L-and G-RPDs converge to the min-max point if the payoff matrix has a saddle in pure strategies; this result is analogous to that obtained in [2] , where rational behavior was modeled by finite automata; (b) if the saddle point is in mixed strategies, both L-and G-RPDs are unable to find these, however, G-RPDs playing against L-RPDs win by converging to the upper value of the game; this result is novel; (c) if an L-RPD or G-RPD is playing against a human that uses his mixed optimal strategy, the RPD is able to find its mixed optimal strategy provided that the payoff matrix is symmetric; this is different from [3] in that finite automata cannot find mixed optimal strategies when playing against humans; (d) rates of convergence for G-RPDs are faster than those for L-RPDs, giving GRPDs an advantage in the transients when playing against L-RPDs in games with a saddle in pure strategies; this result is novel-the previous literature did not address this issue. Under homogeneous fractional interaction, (a) a collective behaves optimally if the level of rationality of each RPD grows at least as fast as the size of the collective; this is similar to the result obtained in [4, 5] , where rational behavior was modeled by finite automata and general dynamical systems, respectively; (b) although G-RPDs behave similarly to L-RPDs in the steady state, the rate of convergence for G-RPDs is much faster than that of L-RPDs; this result is also novel. Under nonhomogeneous fractional interaction, (a) a collective behaves optimally even if the size of the collective tends to infinity as long as the level of rationality of each individual is sufficiently large; this result is similar to that obtained in [5] ; (b) as in homogeneous fractional interactions, the rate of convergence for G-RPDs is much faster than that of L-RPDs, which is also a new result. In the Edgeworth exchange economy [6] , P. T. Kabamba et al. 3 (a) G-RPDs with an identical level of rationality converge to a particular Pareto equilibrium, irrespective of the initial product allocation; this result is different from the classical one where the convergence is to a subset of the Pareto equilibrium, which is defined by the initial allocation; this result is novel; (b) if the level of rationality of the two G-RPDs are not identical, the resulting stable Pareto equilibrium gives advantage to the one with larger rationality; this result is also novel.
Definition of RPD.
To make this paper self-contained, below we briefly recapitulate the definition of RPDs; for more details, see [1] , where a comprehensive literature review is also included.
A probabilistic decider (PD) is a stochastic system defined by a quadruple, 
When a state transition occurs, all other states are selected equiprobably, that is,
Let κ i (Φ;N) denote the steady state probability of state i ∈ when Φ is constant (i.e., the environment is stationary). A PD is rational (i.e., RPD) if the following takes place: inequality ϕ i < ϕ j implies that 4) and, moreover,
An RPD is local (i.e., L-RPD) if
that is, L-RPDs take decisions based on the penalty of the current state. An RPD is global (i.e., G-RPD) if = {1, 2},
4 Mathematical Problems in Engineering that is, G-RPDs take decisions based on the penalties of all states. The properties of P I and P II are described in [1] . In particular, P II may be of the form 8) where functions F and G are characterized in [1] . Examples of appropriate functions F and G can be given as follows:
The current paper addresses the issue of collective behavior of M RPDs, that is, when the penalty function ϕ i , i = 1,2,...,s, is not constant but is changing in accordance with changing states of all members of the collective.
Paper outline.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of a collective of RPDs and describe the problems addressed. The collective behaviors of RPDs in zero sum matrix games, under fractional interactions, and in Edgeworth exchange economies are investigated in Sections 3-5, respectively, and Section 6 gives conclusions. All proofs are given in the appendices.
Collective of RPDs
Modeling.
A collective of RPDs is defined as a set of RPDs, where the penalties incurred by an RPD depend not only on the its state but also on the states of the other RPDs. Specifically, consider a set of M RPDs. Denote the jth RPD by the quadruple, 
is a vector, where ϕ j i (n) denotes the penalty associated with state x j i ∈ j at time n. Furthermore, we assume
where x k (n) ∈ k , k = j, denotes the state of the kth RPD at time n; (c) N j ∈ (0,∞) is a positive number, which denotes the level of rationality of the jth RPD;
is a set of transition probabilities depending on Φ j (n) and N j .
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The collective of RPDs can operate in the following two modes. (α) Parallel operation: if at time n the jth RPD, j = 1,2,...,M, is in state x j i , then the probability that it will make a state transition at time n + 1 is
When a state transition occurs, the RPD chooses any other state with equal probability, that is,
(β) Sequential operation: at each time n, one of the RPDs is chosen with probability 1/M. Suppose the jth RPD is chosen and that it is in state x j i . Then, at time n + 1, it will make a state transition according to (2.3) and (2.4), while all other RPDs remain in their original states.
Problems.
The interactions among the RPDs in a collective are described by the penalties in (2.1), and are defined by the environment surrounding the collective. In this paper, the behavior of collectives of RPDs in zero sum matrix games, under fractional interactions, and in Edgeworth exchange economies are considered. In particular, we address the following problems: given a collective of RPDs and an environment, (i) analyze the steady state probabilities of various decisions as a function of the level of rationality and the parameters of the environment; (ii) investigate the rates of convergence to the steady state. Exact formulations and solutions of these problems are given in Sections 3-5. where m kl , k,l = 1,2, is the payoff to the first player when it selects action k and the second selects action l. Without loss of generality, we assume that
The two players of the matrix game form a collective of RPDs described below.
(i) The first and second player of the matrix game are the first and second RPD of the collective, respectively. (ii) Let j = {1, 2}, j = 1,2, where the states in j correspond to the actions of the RPDs.
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If the jth RPD is G-RPD with functions F and G given by (1.9), then
(v) The RPDs make state transitions according to parallel operation mode. Due to assumptions (i)-(v), the dynamics of a collective of RPDs playing the 2 × 2 matrix game is described by an ergodic Markov chain with transition matrix 
where The solutions to (3.10) are given by These expressions are used below to analyze steady states of collectives where payoff matrices lead to either pure or mixed optimal strategies.
3.2.
Zero sum matrix games having pure optimal strategies. In this subsection, it is assumed that the matrix game at hand has a pure optimal strategy. Without loss of generality, assume the payoff matrix in (3.1) satisfies the relation m 21 < m 11 < m 12 , (3.13) that is, m 11 is the saddle point, and the optimal strategy is for both RPDs to select action 1. Furthermore, assume the RPDs have the same level of rationality, that is,
where N ∈ (0,∞).
Steady state behavior.
The following analysis question is addressed. A1: can RPDs, playing the above matrix game, find their pure optimal strategies, that is, respectively. For the matrix game (3.15) and for the collectives (C1) and (C2), the values of N that are required to converge reliably to the saddle point, for example, κ 11 = 0.95, are 76 and 87, respectively. For the matrix game (3.16), the required values of N are 20 and 68, respectively. Based on the above, the following observations can be made.
(a) Although a G-RPD uses more information than an L-RPD, this does not lead to an advantage as N → ∞ (in the sense that the G-RPD does not receive more than the optimal payoff). (b) Surprisingly, the required N for reliable selection of the saddle point is larger when both players are G-RPDs than when both are L-RPDs. In some games, as the one with payoff matrix (3.16), the difference is quite large.
Transient behavior.
From the above analysis, G-RPDs do not outperform L-RPDs in the steady state. However, the fact that G-RPDs use more information should, in some way, give G-RPDs advantage over L-RPDs. Hence, the following question is addressed. A2: can G-RPDs outperform L-RPDs during the transients of a matrix game? The rates of convergence in time are analyzed first. Given the payoff matrix defined in function of N for the collectives (C1) and (C2). As it follows from this figure, it will take an arbitrarily long time for the game to converge as N becomes large if both players are L-RPDs, while this is not true if both players are G-RPDs. Moreover, when both players are G-RPDs, the time required for convergence becomes shorter as N becomes larger and, when N becomes arbitrarily large, that time tends to zero. Next, consider a matrix game played by (C3). Let P G (n) and P L (n) denote the payoffs to the G-RPD and L-RPD, respectively, at time n, and let generality, assume the payoff matrix (3.1) satisfies the relation,
Hence, the mixed optimal strategy is as follows: the first player selects action 1 with probability The following analysis question is addressed. A: can RPDs playing the matrix game find their mixed optimal strategies? To answer this question, collectives (C1)-(C3) of Section 3.2.1 with N 1 = N 2 = N are considered. Evaluating (3.11), one can see that none of the RPDs is able to find the mixed optimal strategy. Specifically, (i) for (C1), as N → ∞, the game value converges to either the lower or upper value of the game, depending on the payoff matrix, that is, to either m 12 or m 22 ; (ii) for (C2), as N → ∞, the game value converges to the average of the entries of the payoff matrix, that is, to (m 11 + m 12 + m 21 + m 22 )/4; (iii) for (C3), the outcome of the matrix game always converges to the upper value, m 22 , of the game as N → ∞; this means that, when N is sufficiently large, the G-RPD is always receiving more than the optimal payoff, and hence, has an advantage when playing against the L-RPD. Since the players are not able to find their mixed optimal strategies when both are RPDs, we consider the following additional collectives.
(C4) The first player is an L-RPD and the second is a human playing according to his mixed optimal strategy. (C5) The first player is a G-RPD and the second is a human playing according to his mixed optimal strategy. For (C4) and (C5), the transition matrix A in (3.7) becomes 
The steady state probabilities in (3.11) become The steady state probability of the RPD selecting action 1 is given by
We have the following theorem. Hence, when the payoff matrix is symmetric, the RPDs can find their mixed optimal strategies if N is large enough. (i) j = {x 1 ,x 2 } for j = 1,2,...,M.
(ii) Function φ j in (2.1) satisfies Let κ(n) = [κ1(n) κ 2 (n) ··· κ M (n)] be a row vector, where κ k (n) is the probability that k RPDs are in state x 1 at time n, and ν k = k/M. Then, by assumptions (i)-(v), the dynamics of the collective is described by an ergodic Markov chain,
for L-RPDs and G-RPDs, respectively. More compactly, the dynamics can be written as 
where
(4.7)
Homogeneous fractional interaction.
In this subsection, we assume
is a continuous function with a unique global minimum at ν * ∈ (0,1). Relationship (4.8) implies that all the RPDs have the same penalty, which depends on the fraction of the collective in state x 1 . For both cases, where the collective consists of all L-RDPs and all G-RPDs, the steady state probabilities in (4.6) reduce to the same expression, 
The following theorems answer this question.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a collective of M L-RPDs or G-RPDs with homogeneous fractional interactions. Then,
Hence, for a collective with fixed size, the RPDs are able to distribute themselves between states x 1 and x 2 optimally if N is large enough.
Let ν(n) be the fraction of the collective in state x 1 at time n. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Consider a collective of L-RPDs or G-RPDs with homogeneous fractional interactions and fixed N. Moreover, assume the penalty function f is Lipschitz. Then,
Therefore, as the size of a collective becomes arbitrarily large while N is fixed, the RPDs distribute themselves equally between the two states. This behavior is similar to that of a statistical mechanical gas and is referred to as convergence to maximum entropy.
From Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, one can see that the parameters N and M have opposing effects. Increasing N increases the ability of the RPDs to sense the difference between the two states, while increasing M reduces this ability. Thus, we ask the following question.
A2: can the RPDs distribute themselves between states x 1 and x 2 optimally as N and M increase simultaneously? Let Δ be a sufficiently small number and define the intervals,
14) Hence, when both N and M grow without bound, N must grow fast enough so that (4.16) holds in order for the RPDs to distribute themselves among x 1 and x 2 optimally with high probability. Therefore, when both N and M grow without bound and M is growing so fast that (4.18) holds, the convergence to maximum entropy will take place.
Theorem 4.4. Consider a collective of L-RPDs or G-RPDs with homogeneous fractional interactions. Given interval B, there exists a constant C B such that if
lim N→∞ M→∞ N M < C B ,(4.
Transient behavior.
Next, the convergence rates of the collectives are analyzed. Assuming M = 10 and f in (4.9) is given by 
Nonhomogeneous fractional interaction.
In this subsection, we assume Moreover, when the fraction of the RPDs in x 1 is ν * , no RPD can decrease its penalty by changing its state while others stay in their states. Hence, ν * is a Nash equilibrium [7] . For both cases, where the RPDs are all L-RPDs and all G-RPDs, the steady state probabilities in (4.6) become
(4.25) 
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Consider a collective of M L-RPDs or G-RPDs with nonhomogeneous frac
In other words, this theorem states that if f 1 (ν k * +1 ) > f 2 (ν k * ), then, when the fraction of the RPDs in x 1 is ν k * , none of the RPDs can decrease its penalty by changing its state while others stay in their states. Convergence to ν k * is optimal. Similarly, if f 1 (ν k * +1 ) = f 2 (ν k * ), then, when the fraction of the RPDs in x 1 is ν k * or ν k * +1 , none of the RPDs can decrease its penalty by changing its state while others stay in their states. Convergence to ν k * or ν k * +1 is optimal. Hence, for a collective of fixed size and N sufficiently large, the RPDs can find an optimal distribution. Furthermore, |ν * − ν k * | ≤ 1/M. So, if M is large, the distribution is close to ν * if N is sufficiently large. Let Δ be a sufficiently small number and define the interval,
Moreover, let I D ⊂ I so that for all k ∈ I D , we have ν k ∈ D. We have the following theorem. Therefore, as long as N is large enough so that (4.30) is satisfied, the RPDs, unlike under homogeneous fractional interactions, do distribute themselves close to the Nash equilibrium even if the size of the collective is growing without bound.
Transient behavior.
Next, the convergence rates of the collectives are analyzed. Assuming M = 10 and f 1 and f 2 in (4.22) and (4. respectively, Figure 4 .2 shows the second largest eigenvalue, λ 2 , of A in (4.5) as a function of N for collectives consisting of all L-RPDs and all G-RPDs. Similar to collectives with homogeneous fractional interactions, as N becomes large, it will take an arbitrarily long time for L-RPDs to converge while this is not true for G-RPDs.
4.4.
Discussion. The theory presented above may be used for designing autonomously reconfigurable systems. To illustrate this, consider a robot with two operating modes, it can either perform the required work or assemble new robots. The robot is referred to as a worker or a self-reproducer when it is performing work or assembling other robots, respectively. Suppose we have a colony of such robots. For the colony to operate efficiently, there must be a right ratio between the workers and self-reproducers, depending on the environment.
To use the above theory to maintain this ratio, associate each robot with an RPD as a controller, where the states of the RPD correspond to the two operating modes of the robot. Assume the interactions of the robots are modeled as homogenous fractional with the penalty function f defined by the allocation of the robots between the worker and self-reproducer castes. The above theory suggests how the relation of the level of rationality and the size of population should be in order for the colony to sustain itself. Specifically, if the robots are not rational enough as the population becomes large, then the colony will fail to optimally distribute their operating modes. However, if the interactions of the robots are modeled as nonhomogeneous fractional with functions f 1 and f 2 , as long as the level of rationality of the robots are sufficiently large, the colony will still perform optimally even if the size of the colony becomes large.
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Figure 5.1. Edgeworth box describing the exchange economy.
Collective behavior of RPDs in Edgeworth exchange economy
Edgeworth exchange economy.
Following [6] , consider an exchange economy with two individuals, A and B, and two products, P 1 and P 2 . The total amount of the products, P 1 and P 2 , are fixed at Y 1 and Y 2 units, respectively. The allocation of the products between the two individuals exhausts the amounts of the products and is traditionally described by the Edgeworth box [6] shown in The satisfaction of the individuals with a given allocation of the products is measured by two penalty functions. Suppose the allocation of the products between individuals A and B is at O A (w 1 ,w 2 ). Then, the penalties incurred by A and B are
respectively, where
3)
The larger the penalty incurred, the less satisfied the individual. Remark 5.1. In the economics literature, the satisfactions of the individuals are specified by utility functions [6] . The larger the value of the utility function, the greater the satisfaction of the individual. The penalty functions described above can be obtained from these utility functions, for example, by taking the reciprocal. 4) and Y 1 = Y 2 = 5. These penalty functions are reciprocals of the commonly used so-called Cobb-Douglas utility functions [8] . In Figure 5 .2, the dash-dotted diagonal straight line, which consists of points where the level curves of V A and V B are tangent, is the Pareto line in the sense that when the allocation is on this line, neither A nor B can decrease its penalty by changing the allocations of the products without increasing the penalty of the other. Under classical assumptions of the Edgeworth exchange economy, the individuals are assumed to know their penalty functions exactly and never agree on exchanges that increase their penalty. Hence, in the classical model, if the allocation is initially, for instance, at point E in Figure 5 how individuals A and B decide to exchange their products, the results of the exchanges are always in the dark grey region. Moreover, under any exchange policy, the resulting allocation will eventually converge to a point on the segment of the Pareto line, denoted in Figure 5 .2 as FG. When the allocation is on the Pareto line, it cannot change anymore since there will be no agreement on any exchange [6] . (The roles of sets R 1 -R 3 in Figure 5 .2 will become clear in Section 5.4.)
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V A w 1 ,w 2 = w 1 w 2 −0.5 , V B Y 1 − w 1 ,Y 2 − w 2 = Y 1 − w 1 Y 2 − w 2 −0.5 ,(5.
Collective of RPDs in Edgeworth exchange economy.
In order to introduce RPDs in the Edgeworth exchange economy, it is convenient to discretize the decision space. Namely, let 5) where m ∈ N is given. The individuals can only have integer multiple of Δ units of both products and must have at least Δ units of each product, that is, Δ is the unit of exchange. Then, the decision space becomes Assume the individuals in the Edgeworth exchange economy are modeled by G-RPDs and form a collective satisfying the following.
(i) Both A and B are G-RPDs, as defined in Section 1.2, and are referred to as the first and second G-RPD, respectively. (ii) The G-RPDs consider only exchanges that result in at most one Δ change of their possessions. To formalize this statement, assume that O A (w 1 (n),w 2 (n)) is the allocation after n exchanges, and let
Then, the decision space of both G-RPDs is S(w 1 (n),w 2 (n)) = T(w 1 (n),w 2 (n) Similarly, we have 
(5.12)
Scenarios.
To analyze the behavior of G-RPDs in Edgeworth exchange economy, we consider the following scenarios.
(a) The level of rationalities of the G-RPDs are identical, Hence, the G-RPDs become more rational at a faster rate as Δ becomes small so that the product of the level of rationality and Δ 2 is kept at one. (c) The level of rationalities of the G-RPDs are not identical, 16) and N satisfies (5.15), that is, the first G-RPD is four times more rational than the second G-RPD.
Steady state behavior.
The following analysis question is addressed. A: will the allocation of the products converge to the Pareto line (and to which point on the Pareto line) as n → ∞? To investigate this question, assume, for example, that there are five units of both P 1 and P 2 , that is, Y 1 = Y 2 = 5, in the economy and the penalty functions for the G-RPDs are as shown in (5.4). We investigate the allocation of the products as n → ∞, when m in (5.5) varies from 0 to 4 in each of the scenarios (a)-(c). Although the analysis can be carried out analytically using Markov chains, the number of states increases exponentially as Δ becomes small. Hence, computer simulations are employed. The results of the analysis are as follows.
(i) The data for scenario (a) are summarized in Table 5 .1. The last row indicates the frequencies of the allocation of the products converging inside R 1 (see Figure  5 .2), which is the region defined by |w 1 − w 2 | ≤ 0.25. Thus, if N grows linearly with the decrease of Δ, the collective does not converge reliably to the Pareto line. (ii) The data for scenario (b) are summarized in Table 5 .2. The last row indicates the frequencies of the allocation of the products converging inside R 2 (see Figure  5 .2), which is the square region centered at O A (5/2,5/2) with area 1/8. Hence, when N grows quadratically with the decrease of Δ, the product allocation converges to a Pareto optimal and is "fair" in the sense that both G-RPDs have equal amounts of each product. (iii) The data for scenario (c) are summarized in Table 5 .3. The last row indicates the frequencies of the allocation of the products converging inside R 3 (see Figure  5 .2), which is the square region centered at O A (4,4) with area 1/8. Hence, the allocation converges to the small region around O A (4, 4) , which is Pareto optimal, when N is large. Thus, when N 1 = 4N 2 , the first G-RPD takes advantage of the second one in the sense that it ends up with four times as many of both products as the second G-RPD.
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5.5. Discussion. Based on the results in Section 5.4, the following observations are made.
(i) The product allocation converges to a Pareto optimal one if the level of rationality of the G-RPDs is large enough relative to the reciprocal of the unit of exchange. Furthermore, the allocation is a fair one if the G-RPDs have the same level of rationality. However, if one of the G-RPDs has a larger level of rationality, it will take advantage of the other and end up with more products than the other. (ii) In the classical Edgeworth exchange economy, the individuals are tacitly assumed to be of infinite rationality in the sense that they know precisely their utility functions and never accept trades that decrease their utility. As a result, the system is not ergodic, that is, the steady state depends on the initial product allocation. In the RPD formulation, the rationality is bounded [9] , the system is ergodic (due to "mistakes" committed by the individuals in accepting disadvantageous trades) and, therefore, the system converges to a unique equilibrium-the Pareto point where both individuals have equal amount of products, if their rationality is the same.
Conclusions
Paper [1] and the current paper comprise a theory of rational behavior based on rational probabilistic deciders. This theory shows that under simple assumptions, RPDs exhibit autonomous optimal reconfigurable behavior in a large variety of situations, both individually and collectively. Among unexplored topics remains the issue of learning: in the current formulation, RPDs explore the environment every time anew, without taking into account their past experiences. Incorporating learning in RPD behavior is a major topic of future research. 
